<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"><channel><title>ZViz — Field notes</title><description>Container isolation, syscall surface, and the AI-agent code-execution attack surface.</description><link>https://zviz.skelfresearch.com/</link><language>en-us</language><item><title>AI-agent code execution: where the new attack surface lives</title><link>https://zviz.skelfresearch.com/blog/ai-agent-code-execution-attack-surface/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://zviz.skelfresearch.com/blog/ai-agent-code-execution-attack-surface/</guid><description>An agent runtime executes code that didn&apos;t exist twenty seconds ago, generated by a model that may have been prompt-injected by content it scraped twenty minutes ago. The threat model is unusual. Container security people should pay attention.</description><pubDate>Tue, 02 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title>Isolation models, ranked by what they actually break</title><link>https://zviz.skelfresearch.com/blog/isolation-models-ranked/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://zviz.skelfresearch.com/blog/isolation-models-ranked/</guid><description>Process, namespace, syscall-filter, userspace-kernel, MicroVM, hardware. Five layers, five honest trade-offs, one ranking that doesn&apos;t pretend a chroot is a sandbox.</description><pubDate>Tue, 26 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title>Why namespaces aren&apos;t enough for untrusted code</title><link>https://zviz.skelfresearch.com/blog/namespaces-arent-enough/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://zviz.skelfresearch.com/blog/namespaces-arent-enough/</guid><description>Namespaces are a packaging primitive. A user/pid/mount namespace contains nothing on its own. The escape budget is the syscall surface — and on a stock kernel, that&apos;s roughly 350 system calls of attack area.</description><pubDate>Tue, 12 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate></item></channel></rss>